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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
HYDE P.A..R.I~ TO\Y-N.
a Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

. vs.
G-EORGE CR.UIBERS .A..ND
J, .A C Y CIL.-L.\IBERS. His
Wife, E. S. CHAMBERS, a
Single Man, BERTHA POULSEN, as Guardian of ADELL
IDA POlLSEX, a Minor,
D~\VID J. WEEKS~ and
?\L~RY WEEKS, His "\Vife,
Defendants and Respondent3.
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Appeal From First Judicial District Court in and
for Cache County
Honorable Lewis Jones, Judge

Appellant's Reply Brief
In entering upon the preparation of a reply
brief in this cause, we are impressed with thP
thought that there is little excuse for any extended
elaboration of our contentions, as set forth in thr·
original brief.
We have already given our vie\v~ as fully and
emphasized them as thoroughly as pO'ssible; and our
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opponent's have made their answer thereto. The
p1·incipal necessity for a reply arises from various
state1nent·s and conclusions in our opponents' brief
which, in our opinion, are not supported by the
record.
At the outset, on page one of respondents'
ibrief, it is stated that ''It is the contention of the
defendants (respondent's) tha.t even though there.
was no express agreement that they should give up
their culinary streams as a part of the consideration of the town ,granting them these taps, that under all the facts and circumstances there was an
implied agreement that as a consideration for such
taps the plaintiff (appellant) could have any additional \vater that might be saved from the culinary
stream·s of the defendants. . . . . '' ThP same
argument is advanced elsewhere in their brief
(Pages 16, 22-23, 29).
Our opponents make no attempt to point out
any tes.timony in the record to support. this bald
conclusion. Had there been any basis for the position taken by them] it would have been a simple
matter to refer to the testimony on which they relied. We have searched the record, from beginning
to end, and now as:sert without fear of contradiCtion that there is no testimony tending to prove the
existence of any implied agreement.
On page 23 of their brief, we find this further
statement: ''The fact that on cros·s examination
Mr. Weeks did not expressly mention the giving up
of the culinary stream, does not change the fact
that he did give up the stream, a fact which is not
disputed in this case.'' Presumably, from this
statement, counsel intended to have the Court believe that while there may have been some teRtimany on cross examination tending to prove that
there was no other consideration given for the tap
1
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"~ater,

over and nbovP the right of "·ny, there was
no such evidence to be found in the direct testimony.

An examination of the record discloses, both on
c~irect and cross exan1ina tion, very definite testimony to the effect that 1·espondents gave nothing,
over and above the right of "·ay, for the t.ap stream's
whieh they received from appellant. Furthermore, it is very clear in the evidence that the predecessor of the re·s.pondent Chamber~ (John P.
Toolson) never had or claiined any culinary
stream; hence he, at least, could ·give no ·such additional consideration to appellant.
MR.

"\\EEI~~.

on c~irect examination, testified as follows (Trans. 81; ~\.b. 31) :

''Q. (By MR. HARRIS): All right, can
you tell us in substance what the statement ''as~ tht proposition "Tas, that you
mentioned!
A. \\ell, they ask if a dribble, they said,
would be enough to do· us. I said, yes, for
culinary purpose:'.
Q. All right. They a~ked you if you
would be sath;fied with a dribble through
the pipe line?
4-:\.. Yes sir.
Q. What n·ere you to give them for that?
A. I was to give them a right of way.

Q. lVhat if anything was said to you, what
you were to give?
A. They said for the right of way."
The foregoing testimony,
overlooked by respondents.

apparently,

wa~
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What the same vvi tnes s (Weeks) s.aid on cross
examination, was equally explicit. We quote (Tr.
115-116; A b. 36) :
For thi·s tap stream that you received, you gave Hyde Pa.rk the right to
run this pipe line over your ground~
A. Yes, it was their idea. I ought to have
enough good water to drink -

'' Q.

Q. You traded a right of way over your
land for this tap; that is correct isn't it~
A. "\Vhy, I guess you would call that
correct
Q. I·s that what you
A. Yes.

did~

You didn't pay them any money for
it did you~
A. Pay them any money~
Q.

Q. Yes.
A. What do you call land and

property~

Just answer my question. You didn't
pay any amount of cash did you~
A. No.
Q.

For this tap stream they gave you;
you gave them a right of way over your
land?
A. Yes ·sir, it was their proposition.
Q.

Yes, and that is all you gave them?
A. Well, here -

Q.
Q.

Just answer that question yes or no.
(Objection).

Q. Is that what you gave, this right of
way?
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..:\.. Ye·s, and the dronag-es they da1naged.
I don't ~ay nothing about the dantagP~,
they haY~ damaged me before.

Q. You mean in pa~~ing over your land 1
. ...\... Yes sir, in digging it up several times.

Q. That is all you g~Ye them Y
A. That i'S all I got.
Q. That i~ you got the tap stream didn't
you, for the time being!
A. Nothing said about the time being.
Q. For a certain timeA. I gave up the right of way.
Q. Until this spring you got a tap spring~
A. \\hich spring·?
Q. l~n til the spring of 1939 ~
A. Yes sir.
Q. That is correct~
A. Yes sir.
Q. And for that you allowed them to pass
over your land mth their pipe~
A. Ain't that about enough to pass over
that.''
The record disclose-s that the respondent Weeks
owned the land in 1911 and was a party, to the negotiations with appellant. The other res.pondent, l\f r.
Chambers, acquired his land subsequent to the
1911 negotiations. His predecessor in interest,
John P. Toolson, held the land_ when appellant constructed its pipe line across what is now the
Chambers property.
On the question of the consideration paid for
the tap water, :!fr. Toolson testified for respondents as fo1lows (Tr. 128; Ab. 37-38):

''Q. Did you have some talk about what
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kind of a deal that you "rould make for the
water right~
A. I think I did. We had met in that
capacity several times. I don't recall who
they were, even.
Q. You don't recall who they were~
A. I have heard, but I don't recall.
All right. Do you recall the substance
of what was ·said about extending that pipe
line across this fifty acres of land~
MR. YOUNG: Yes or no.
Q.

MR. HARRIS: Q. Do you remember
\vha.t the substance of it was~
A. Yes.

All right, can you state to the court,
in your own language, the suhs,tance of
what was· said about constructing this pipe

Q.

line~

A.

They asked for a right of V\ray -

MR. YOUNG: That :is objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, a
proper foundation not having been laid,
not being shown that he talked to any officer of Hyde Park, or any one authorized
to make statements and admission on behalf of the town.

1fR. HAR,RIS: We will follow it up by
showing that Hyde Park did actually carry
out this agreement.
THE CO·URT: Overruled.
MR. HARRIS: Q. You may s.tate the
substance of what was said.
A. ·well they came for a right of way
across my land, and in the discussion I
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-'
asked theu1 for a tap for 'rater. 'l"hey didn't
seen1 to n1ake much objection. They said
most of them 'vanted money for their right
of ""ay. I also askt.\d about n trough.
They didn't know about that.
e ·got together on that matter.''

''T

QUESTIOKS INVOLVED
l~nder

this heading, on page 2 of their brief,

counsel state that '• The primary question involved
is: Did the plaintiff show such fact·s as to constitute a necessity for this condemnation proceeding!''
"We respectfully submit that the 'So-called primary question con-stitutes no issue on this appPal.
A.ppellant commenced the action and sought to condemn a right-of-way for its new pipe line over the
lands of respondents. Respondents answered, and
the court held that appellaut already had a right
of way, and that no order of condemnation \va:s
necessary. In their amended answer and counterclaim, respondents appealed to the court to determine their right to tap water from appellant's
pipe line. Appellant joined issue and the case wa~
tried and decided by the trial court on that issue,
and on that issue alone. Under the judgment of
the court, respondents were held to be entitled to
thP use of a tap connected with appellant's pipe
line, to supply them and their ·successors in intPrest with sufficient culinary water for human consumption and for stock watering purposes.
All of the assignments of appellant are directed to this phase of the controversy between the
parties. K o- assignment whatever went to the ruling of th~ court relating to appellant's right of
co-ndemnation. The ref ore, thi·s so-called primary
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question has no place at all in the case. And particularly is this so in view of the fact that respondents also failed to make any crO'ss.-assignment of
error in relation thereto.
Where a matter is not challenged, either by an
assignment or cross.-as:signment of error, it is not
before the court for review.
Meissner, et al v. Ogden L. & I. Ry. Co.
etal, 65 Utah 1 ; 233 Pac. 569.
Perrin v. U. P. R. Co., 59- Utah 1; 201 Pac.
405.
Teakle v. R.. R., 32 Utah 276; 80 Pac.
402.

ASSIGNMENT NO. 2
In their consideration of .A:ss.ignment of Error
No. 2, respondents, beginning on page 4 of their
·brief, take the position that the contract between
appellant and respondents was valid because appeL
lant owned a surplus of water over and above the
needs of its ·citizens. It is our contention that this
Inatter is wholly immaterial. The contract was not
based upon the exrstence of any surplus. In fact,
·no mention \vas made of surplus at any time.
Respondents grounded the right to a tap stream
on an oral contract entered into hy the parties in
t.he year 1911. The record shows that in that year,
and for many years immediately subsequent thPreto, appellant was constantly short of water, so
short in fact that app·ellant ·sp·ent money on s.evera.l
occasions in successive years to tap sources. of
WJater ·supply higher up in Birch Creek . Canyon
than the point of the· original intake. Certainly.
this is the best kind of proof that there was an
actual shortage of water, otherwise, the officers of
appellant would never have spent money on such
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undertakings. The te~tin1ony of all the 'vitnPsses
bears out fully the exi~tl'llee of such shortage.
'\llate\er te~ti1nony "~as offered by respondents, tending to proYe thl• pos'Sibility of a surplus,
pertained entirely to the yen rs since the cons.truction of the last pipe line in about the year. 1935.
It would seem that the rig·ht~ of the parties must
have been fixed long before this time, and that the
court could not make a eontract for the parties
based upon a surplus. if any such there be, coming
into exi'Stence some twenty-three or four years
after the date of the contract. Especially is this
HO in the light of tl1e evidence that appellant never
did alloW" respondents to take "·ater out of the new
pipe line after it 'vas constructed. The theory of
respondents in their cross complaint was certainly
not based upon the existence of a surplus in 1911;
the theory "as based "holly and solely upon rights
growing out of an exchange alleged to have been
made in that year.
Before concluding our reference to this part
of counsel's brief, "e ''-ish to point out that G;eo.
Z. Lamb was not the mayor of the Hyde Park
Board in 1911, as contended on page 7 of their
brief. )[r. Lamb "·as a member of the board and
wa.termaster in that year. (Tr. 209; A b. 58).

ASSIGNMENT NO. 7
Respondents next take up the ·several matters
considered by appellant on the question of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
court's finding No. 13, to which appellant's AR·signment of Error No. 7 was directed.
We feel that the questions involved! were adequately
covered in our original brief. There would ~eem
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to be but one matter to which we think the court's
attention should be called: On page 13 it js stated
that "There is evidence as to the number of cattle
that both ·weeks and Chambers had on their
premises, . . . . ''
Again, couns.el fail to point out any testimony
in the record to support their position. Furthermore, it will be noted the assignment of error un\der consideration was not directed to what the evidence did or did not sho,v, but rather to the failure
1of the court to make any finding at all a·s to the
number of cattle customarily kept on the premises.
Had such a finding been made, then appellant
could have determined from the record wheth0.r or
not there was evidence to ~)upport that finding.
We might also point out that at no time during
the, trial of the case was the ·slightest atten1pt n1adc
to es,tablish the number of cattle ":rhich the pre~
decessor of the respondent, Chambers, n1aintained
on his premi·ses; nor, the nun1ber of cattle ,,,.hieh
that respondent maintained there after he becan1e
the owner of the premises.

THE CONTRAC~r 'rO DEiji\TER \V ~~'"rER ~rO
THESE DEFENDANTS ·WAS V.1\LID AND
BINDING.
This phase of the controversy is discussed by
respondents, ~beginning on page 15 of their brief.
It is contended that the oral contract entered
into in 1911 for the exchange of a right of \vay for
a tap stream, wa·s not a. contract in perpetuity but
rather merely an exchange of property or property
rights for other property. This seems to be the
extent of respondents.' argument on this point.
Their claim of a vested intere·st accruing in
1911 is contrary to . the position taken by them
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:earlier in the brief: also, it is contrary to the position taken by tlu~In iinnll'diately follo,ving, on pa.ge
16 of their brief. They state: .. It ~was, a mere
agree1nent to ~upply 'Yater out of the exce·ss water
o'vned by the plaintiff.''
This latter position is clearly inconsistent
with the Yiew that a Yested property right was
given. The contract upon "·hich respondent·s based
their claim required that appellant keep the pipe
line, used to deliver their water, in a good state of
repair at all time'S, and also required that when the
same became worn out that it be replaced by appellant. Certainly, one could not say that the rights
were· determined entirely in 1911 as contended for
by reospondent~ on page 15 of their brief.
In our original brief we cited ample authority
for our contention that a contract such as respondents claim was entered into by the parties in 1911,
could not be a perpetual contract but. rather
would be a contract terminable at will. Respondents urge that th0se authorities are not in point.
We call the attention of the Court, however, to· the
fact that the principle decided by thofe cases was
moost decidedly in point, that is, that where a city
rurports to contract _in perpetuity, the court·s will
construe such contract to be terminable at will.
Applying such a principle to the case at bar,· appeL
lant would have a right to ·terminate at will the
contract contended for by respondent.· In the instant case, it is clear that appellant did terminate
the contract, if, in fact, any such contract ever
existed.
On the question of the statute of frauds con·stituting a bar to the contract now s-ought to be
enforced, res·pondents cite Section 33-5-8, Revisecl
Statutes of Utah, 1933, reading as follows:
''Kothing in this chapter contained shall
be construed to abridge the powers of
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court to cornpel the specific performance
of agreements in case of part performance
thereof.''
'l,wo cas.es are cited bearing upon this same question: Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Ut. 480; 53 P. 218;
Lynch v. Coviglio, 17 Ut. 106; 35 P. 983.
Respondents are in error in claiming that this
~eetion and the cases cited construing the same,
apply to contracts not to be performed in one year.
. .t\.s a matter of fact, the doctrine of ''part performance'' applies only to contracts relating to
real estate. See
Williston on Contracts, Section 533.
The t\vo cases cited involve contracts pertaining to real estate and the Utah Court properly
applied the doctrine of part performance. But the
case at bar mus,t be clearly distinguished from ·such
a doctrine.
While it is clear that respondent·s could have
performed all or part of their agreement within
one year, yet appellant could not have done so, !or
the reason that it) under respondents' contention,
was required to deliver water to them for all time.
Appellant contends that the statute of fraud's
applies to such a contract and renders it unenforceable. Mr. Williston, in Section 504 of his 'vork on
(~on tracts, ·states:
''There are numerous decisions which
seem supported by a more reasonable construction of the statute which holds that if
after full performance on one 'Side, performance on the other side still oonnof·
take place within a year, the statute is
applicable; and any redress which can be
obtained for either full or partial performSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ance must be based on principles of quasicontract. ' '
In a note found in
Volume 138, American State Re·ports,
at page 610,
the same view expressed by l\Ir. vVilliston is stated
as being the more logical. Each of these references
is based on cases cited in connection with the text
and is supported by these authorities.

CONSTIT"CTIOXALITY OF THE QUESTIO·N
On page 18 of their brief, respondents. cite two

Colorado cases and one California cas.e. The
principle decided by the cases can be ·stated ters.ely
as follows: C9ntracts entered into by a municipality in its proprietary capacity, are not restricted
by public policy to the same extent as where the
city i'8 acting in its governmental capacity. 'fhe
cases cited held that in. contracting with respect to
water supply the city acted in its proprietary
capacity, and that it had the same powers in that
capacity as an ordinary ~rporation. They ~:re
not in point with the case at bar, for the rea·son
that cities in Utah are expressly restricted, in their
power in attempting to sell or exchange water
rights or sources of water ·supply, by the constitutional pro\ision referred to in appellant's original
brief. None of the cases cited by respondent
makes.reference to any ·statutory or constitutional
limitation of powers. Certainly the Utah cases
cited on page 19 of respondents' brief do not consider the question involved in the case at bar.

The Ellerheck ca·se (Ellerbeck v. Salt I.nke
City, 29 Ut. 361; 81 P. 273) merely holds that if a
city exchanges its water for other water, or water
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rights, the quantities of the water may be different; so long as the water exchanged is of equal
value the requirements of the con·stitutional provision are met. To be more exact, Salt Lake City
.attempted to exchange irrigation water, not fit for.
culinary use, for a much less quantity of water
suitable for culinary purposes, and the Court held
that it 'yas. immate'rial that the quantities were
'different, if the value to the city 'vas substantially
equal.
The case of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City
Water & Electric P'o.,ver Company (24 Utah 249;
67 P. 672; 25 Utah 456; 71 P. 1069) ha:s no connec6on with the case at bar at all. However~ this
much might be said: Salt Lake City, of cours.e,
never had any right to water. It merely had a
right to use water if it could place it to beneficial
u·se. Beneficial use was the limit of its right and
the Court held that any water not placed to beneficial use by the city was public water and was
fnbject to appropriation by any other person.
We find it impossible to see any connection
'between either of thes.e cases and the case at bar.
On pag-e 21 of their brief, re·spondents refer
to two contracts entered into between Smithfield
Irrigation Company and appellant. The first contract is dated July 9, 1912. It provides in effect
that appellant would give to the Smithfield Irrigation District, 25 acres of water right from the
Logan and Richmond Irrigation District, and that
appellant should have the right to divert from
Birch Creek certain water for its own purposes.
The amount of the water involved is. not stated, except that the water delivered by appellant to the
irrigation district was to be twice as much as the
w··ater diverted by appellant from. Birch Creek
(~anyon.
It was further provided that appellant
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should pay tl1e a'SBt:"BBUH:"nts levied on the water
right which it transferred to the Smithfield Irriga_
tion District.. From the aets of the parties, it is a
fair inference to say that the 8mithfield Irrigation
District, 'vhich di~trict i~ no'v Smithfield Irrigation Company, a corporation, "~as to be required to
delh. .er to appt>llant, out of Birch Creek Canyon,
at least half as n1uch "-ater a:s. appellant delivered
the irrigation district. It i~ also ·a fair inference to ·say that the parties recognized that the
origina'l diversion f.rom Birch Creek Canyt>n hy
appellant ga\e appellant less water than that
amount, and, thertfore, no opposition "~as raised
to the repeated efforts of appellant to get more
water out of Birch Cre~k Canyon, by extending its
diversion point to additional 'Springs located higher
np the canyon. Thi~ condition seemed to have
existed until finally, in 1935, appellant decided to
extend its intake to a much· larger spring situated
in Birch Creek Canyon, v.hich spring is the pre·sent intake of app~llant 's system. In 1935, on the
22nd day of January, the second contract referred
-to in respondents' brief \\as entered jnto between
appellant and the Smithfield Irrigation Company.
This contract expressly provided that appellant
should be entitled to .50 of a second foot of the flow
of the waters of this spring:- and that all of the
flow of the spring above that amount should remain the property of the Smithfield Irrigation.
Company, and should be allowed to continue to flo"'
down Birch Cref?k. Thus the partie·s, by written
contract, recognized the right of appellant to continue to take other sources of water supply . in
sufficient quantity to guarantee the amount contracted to be delivered to appellant, thereby recognizing the same course of ~onduct as the parties
had actually worked under before the execution of
this latter contract. A. -further provision 'vas, that

to
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if, in the future, this source should fail, appellant

\vould be entitled to use other sources of supply to
guarantee the quantity of water so granted.
The contract al'so provided as follows:
"It is further understood and agreed that
the party of the second part (appellant)
will quit clailn to the party of the first
part all of its right, title and interest, if
any, in the "\va.ters of Birch Creek, save
and except only, the \Vaters hereinafter
referred to."
_, Re·spondents interpret this to mean that appellant quit claimed to the irrigation company water~
which it had received from respondents. Certainly the contract does not justify the assumption of
respondent in this particular. The contract recited
that a di·spute had arisen bet,veen the parties with
res,pect to the ownership of certain waters in Birch
Creek Canyon. This contract was entered into to
settle that dispute. The contract further provided
that the appellant would pay to the Smithfield
I rriga.tion Company the sum of $500.00. Counsel
3ay that this \vas in lieu of the provisions in the
old contract that appellant would pay the asses.;:;ments on the stock transferred to the irrigation
company. This as·sumption may, or may not, be
correct. The contract does not state why the
$500.00 vvas paid, and as far as we know, there is
no evidence to justify the a·ssumption of respondents in this respect.
\tVe have referred to these contracts a.t considerable length to ans\ver the claim that appellant
acquired \Vater rights from re·spondents. The record shows that appellant claims .50 of a second
foot of water which it acquired from the Smithfield Irrigation Company. It never clain1ed any
further rights, and it does not no\Y receive any
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greater right~. .J.:\s a llHlt.ter of fact, it is a fair
inference fron1 t11e record that previous to 1935
the Sn1ithfield Irrigation Con1pany, or its predece~~~.•r in intere~t. the irrigation dist riet, never
actually delivered to appellant a:s much water as
it was oblig'ated to deliYer by Yirtue of the contract of 1911.
On page :2:2. respondents again repeat that they
do not claim under any express contract but claim
that it ''a~ implied from the conduct of the parties
that re'Spondents granted to appellant certain
waters in Birch Creek. ~\gain, we say, that there
is no evidence in the record tending in any degree
to prove any such implied agreement bet\\~een thf:'
parties. Certainly., the respondent Chambers, who
never had any culinary stream, could not make the
slighteost pretense to the existence of any such implied agreement. It is true that }Ir. Weeks said
that he had abanoned his culinary stream after he
received the tap water. But he did not claim tha.t
this action zcas induced b'!-J any request or representation of tlle (!_ppellant or any of its officers,
and did not sho·n· ho1r a p pcllant 'loas or co~tld be
benefitted by his abandonment in any amount
uJhatsoerer. Throughout respondents' brief the
claim is constantly made that previous to 1911 the
respondent Weeks had a steady stream of water
which he used for culinary purpo·ses; that he
abandoned this water and that appellant ""'~as the
0eneficiary of this abandonment. Not only, however, does respondent Weeks fail to show how
appellHnt could possibly have benefitted from thi's
abandonment, but the claim in this regard is inconsistent with other parts of his own testimony.
On page 115 of the Tran~cri pt, 36 of the ~hstract,
he testified that he and one Reed, a neighbor, constructed the ditch themselves and later on he gave
rights in the ditch to other parties (not to appelI
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lant); that as a result of this disposal of hi·s rights
he and his grantees "\Vere forced to take turns from
the ditch from then on. Thus the reason that this
respondent does not have a steady s.tream, at least
during the high water s.eason, is apparent: He dis[JOsed of so 1nuch of his rig·hts in the ditch that his
turn came at intervals, too infrequent to meet his
requiren1ents. Had he retained ali of his original
rights he would have been able to make use of his
ditch for culinary purposes.
Beginning at page 24 of their brief, respondents discuss three Utah case's, and certain sections
of the Utah statute.
Section 15-8-14, R. S. Utah, permits a city to
t-:ell its surplus "later outt:.ide of the city limits. In
~:he Genola case ( Genola v. Santaquin, 96 Ut. 104;
85 P. (2d) 790) the Court ·stated that this meant
a sale to its ultimate consumers in the same 'vay
as it sold water to the citizens of the town; that is.
to ·~ay, if the city actually had a S1J;rpl us it might
serve a resident of contiguous territory upon the
same terms and conditions as it serves its own
citizens. But manifestly it does not mean that a
contract such as contended for by the respondents
would be authorized under this section of the stat_
ute. For further clarification of this view, reference is again made to the language of Mr. Justice
\Volfe in the Genola case quoted on page 23 of
appellant's original brief.
Of course, the case of Muir v. Murray City, 55
U t. 368 ; 186 P. 433, the first case discussed under
the heading beginning on page 24, has no relationRhip to the case at bar. It merely held that Murray
City could borrow money for the purpo·se of con~tructing a power line outside of the city limits.
The two other cases ap·pearing under the s.ame
heading (Ellerbeck v. Salt Ijake City, 29 lJt. 361;
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\Y'nter \\' orks Co., ~~;~ Ut.
~8~); 93 P. 8~~)) havl~ alrl~ndy l'l'C.eived a.tt~ntion
el-se"·here in thiB brief. They in no sense authorize
a city to enter into a rontraet to deliYer a definite
~-.mount of "~ater in perpetuity.
Yet, if effect is
to be given to the arg1.m1ent:s advanced by our
opponent5. nothing- :short of that very thing; would
be required of appellant.

81 P.

~73;

Brununit

Y.

For the reasons herein set forth, \Ye urge that
the case should be remanded to the trial court for
further proce~dings.
Re'Spectfully submitted,
YO-cXG & BlLLEK AXD
IR\"'I~""E 5 SKEEX, THURMAN & MINER,
~ttorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Dated February 9, 1940.
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